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Abstract
We consider a problem of dynamically pricing a single product sold by a monopolist over a short time period.
If demand characteristics change throughout the period, it becomes attractive for the company to adjust price
continuously to respond to such changes (i.e., price-discriminate intertemporally). However, in practice there
is typically a limit on the number of times the price can be adjusted due to the high costs associated with
frequent price changes. If that is the case, instead of a continuous pricing rule the company might want to
establish a piece-wise constant pricing policy in order to limit the number of price adjustments. Such a pricing
policy, which involves optimal choice of prices and timing of price changes, is the focus of this paper.
We analyze the pricing problem with a limited number of price changes in a dynamic, deterministic
environment in which demand depends on the current price and time, and there is a capacity/inventory
constraint that may be set optimally ahead of the selling season. The arrival rate can evolve in time arbitrarily,
allowing us to model situations in which prices decrease, increase, or neither. We consider several plausible
scenarios where pricing and/or timing of price changes are endogenized. Various notions of complementarity
(single-crossing property, supermodularity and total positivity) are explored to derive structural results:
conditions sufficient for the uniqueness of the solution and the monotonicity of prices throughout the sales
period. Furthermore, we characterize the impact of the capacity constraint on the optimal prices and the
timing of price changes and provide several other comparative statics results. Additional insights are obtained
directly from the solutions of various special cases.
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Abstract
We consider a problem of dynamically pricing a single product sold by a monopolist over a short time
period. If demand characteristics change throughout the period, it becomes attractive for the company to
adjust price continuously to respond to such changes (i.e., price-discriminate intertemporally). However,
in practice there is typically a limit on the number of times the price can be adjusted due to the high
costs associated with frequent price changes. If that is the case, instead of a continuous pricing rule the
company might want to establish a piece-wise constant pricing policy in order to limit the number of price
adjustments. Such a pricing policy, which involves optimal choice of prices and timing of price changes,
is the focus of this paper.
We analyze the pricing problem with a limited number of price changes in a dynamic, deterministic
environment in which demand depends on the current price and time, and there is a capacity/inventory
constraint that may be set optimally ahead of the selling season. The arrival rate can evolve in time
arbitrarily, allowing us to model situations in which prices decrease, increase, or neither. We consider
several plausible scenarios where pricing and/or timing of price changes are endogenized. Various notions
of complementarity (single-crossing property, supermodularity and total positivity) are explored to derive
structural results: conditions suﬃcient for the uniqueness of the solution and the monotonicity of prices
throughout the sales period. Furthermore, we characterize the impact of the capacity constraint on the
optimal prices and the timing of price changes and provide several other comparative statics results.
Additional insights are obtained directly from the solutions of various special cases.
Keywords: Pricing; Economics; Complementarity; Menu Costs.
∗The author is grateful to Gerard Cachon, Jiri Chod, Pranab Majumder, Nils Rudi and Rober Shumsky for discussions
and helpful comments on the earlier versions of this paper. The comments of three anonymous referees helped to improve and
streamline the paper.
1
1 Introduction
Price discrimination by the time of purchase is a standard practice in many industries. A person eager to
buy a new designer suit will pay a much higher price early in the season whereas a person who is not so eager
will pay a much lower price at the end of the season. On the other hand, customers buying airline tickets
far in advance are typically more price sensitive than those who make their purchases at the last minute.
In both of these cases companies can benefit from the use of intertemporal price discrimination (dynamic
pricing) but, due to particular customer preferences, industry-specific pricing policies diﬀer significantly1.
An attractive way to price-discriminate is to change the price continuously over time by reacting to any shifts
in demand characteristics. However, such a practice is often either not feasible or too costly. In the airline
industry, for example, reservation system limitations do not allow for continuous price changes even though
airlines do change prices quite frequently. In other cases (including, for example, cruise line operation and
theaters), the sale is made through a network of agents with prices pre-printed in catalogs, which makes
price adjustments costly. A similar problem is faced by catalog retailers who incur significant costs each
time prices change and new catalogs have to be printed. In the general retail setting each price decrease is
communicated to customers by means of advertising and hence, again, significant costs are incurred each
time prices are adjusted. Zbaracki et al. [33] cite the case of a large industrial manufacturer spending more
than $1M per year to administer price changes (20% of the net margin). Sometimes there is also a fear of
antagonizing customers through too frequent price changes. For all these reasons, in a variety of practical
situations companies change prices only a limited number of times throughout the sales period. Empirical
evidence of the high costs associated with price adjustments is plentiful: see, for example, Levi et al. [20]
for supermaket chains, Levi et al. [21] for multiproduct retailers and Zbaracki et al. [33] for industrial
manufacturers. Yet, studies that link cost of price changes to dynamic pricing policies are scarce. Recent
advances in e-commerce and information systems have decreased the costs of price changes (see Brynjolfsson
and Smith [6]) making them less of an issue in electronic commerce. However, there is still a long way to go
before this innovation is adopted in areas like brick-and-mortar retailing and moreover, customer antagonism
to frequent price changes will still remain even in e-commerce. As we will demonstrate, correctly identifying
the optimal pricing policy when only a limited number of price changes are allowed may be more complex
than identifying the optimal pricing policy in the absence of this limitation.
A whole separate stream of economics literature studies price stickiness, a phenomenon in which firms some-
times try to avoid changing prices frequently due to the costs (often called “menu costs”) associated with
such changes. Zbaracki et al. [33] provide a survey of the relevant literature and give empirical evidence
of the large magnitude of menu costs in the industrial setting. In particular, they separate out three cost
components: physical (e.g., changing price labels), managerial (including information-gathering, decision-
making and communication costs), and customer (including negotiation and communication costs) and find
1Companies can also benefit from dynamic pricing policies because of the stochastic nature of demand. This aspect of
dynamic pricing is outside of the scope of this paper. However, in the stochastic setting our results can be used heuristically in
a rolling-horizon mode using the certainty equivalent formulation.
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that managerial and customer costs are orders of magnitude larger than the direct physical costs associated
with price changes.
This paper focuses on two issues that arise when a firm uses intertemporal price discrimination with a limited
number of price changes: how to price the product on each time interval when the price is fixed and when
to switch from one price to the other. In our model, customers arrive continuously at a deterministic rate
that is a function of time and current price. By assuming that the functional form of the arrival rate is
an almost entirely arbitrary (price and time-dependent) function, we combine in one paper the analysis of
situations in diﬀerent industries in which an optimal pricing policy is monotonically increasing (as is typical
for airlines), monotonically decreasing (as is typical in fashion retailing) or neither. Moreover, in addition to
situations in which capacity is not a constraint (e.g., production-to-order), we analyze situations in which
capacity/inventory can be a constraint (e.g., some fashion retail situations and service applications includ-
ing airlines, hotels, performance events) that may be set optimally at the commencement of the selling season.
Several scenarios are considered in this paper. We begin our analysis by assuming that a set of allow-
able prices is given exogenously (e.g., due to competitive considerations) and show that the timing of price
changes may be complicated by the presence of multiple local minima and maxima and provide intuition as
to why this is the case. Regularity conditions that ensure various degrees of complementarity — the single-
crossing property, total positivity and supermodularity — between the pricing and the timing components of
the demand function are shown to be suﬃcient for the uniqueness of the timing solution. The very same
conditions help characterize situations in which a monotone price increase/decrease throughout the sales
period is optimal and also allow us to determine the impact that the change in one of the prices will have
on the optimal timing of price changes. A surprising result here is that, due to the limited number of price
changes, the optimal timing of price changes can increase or decrease in price, depending on the comparison
between the price that is set on a given time interval and the optimal continuous price. Finally, we show
that the optimal timing is a monotone function of capacity.
We then turn to the situation in which the pricing decision is endogenized but the timing of price adjustments
is exogenously specified (e.g., the timing of price changes coincides with holidays). We provide conditions
suﬃcient for the uniqueness of the pricing decision and characterize the impact of exogenous changes in
timing on optimal prices. We also show that all prices are monotone in the capacity constraint. If in either
scenario the capacity can be set optimally before the season begins, we show that there is a unique solution
to the capacity problem. Finally, we analyze the problem of jointly setting timing, pricing, and capacity.
We show that, if the revenue rate function is Totally Positive of Order 2, then the pricing policy is monotone
throughout the sales period regardless of the timing and capacity decisions. To gain further insights into the
problem, we introduce a simplifying assumption in order to separate shifts in customer price sensitivity from
changes in demand intensity, thus making the problem more transparent. Closed-form solutions for pricing
and capacity decisions are obtained, and many of the results derived for the general form of the arrival rate
function are illustrated. In particular, we demonstrate how the timing of price changes can diﬀer depending
on the functional form of the demand function. We also address the issue of optimal capacity selection and
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find that, in this simplified problem, the capacity decision can be made without advanced knowledge of the
price discrimination policy. Hence, as opposed to many situations described in the literature, marketing
and operations functions within the firm can be separated so that the firm does not need to commit to a
specific pricing scheme at the time of the capacity decision. The separability of the pricing and inventory
decisions is a useful insight since these decisions are usually made at diﬀerent points in time. In conclusion,
we consider examples illustrating the losses that accrue from an insuﬃcient number of price changes.
2 Relation to the literature
While continuous dynamic pricing problems have received extensive treatment in the literature, the variant of
the same problem with only a limited number of price changes has been investigated less frequently. Research
in relevant areas spans streams of papers in economics, marketing, and operations management with many
papers incorporating both pricing and operational decisions (production/inventory policy). Economists
coined the term “intertemporal price discrimination” to describe discriminatory pricing based on the time of
purchase (see survey by Varian [31]). Research in this area is rather sparse, with the main focus on analyzing
price discrimination from the social welfare point of view. The earliest papers in this stream consider the
problem of pricing durable goods (i.e., products that create secondary markets) over time. See Coase [9]
and Bulow [7] for the corner stone work on durable goods.
In marketing there is a large stream of literature on pricing (see a comprehensive survey by Rao [28]) with
the most relevant papers modeling pricing as a dynamic continuous decision. This stream includes models
that may account for consumer behavior, competition, and other factors, with many papers focusing specif-
ically on markdowns. A related set of papers looks at the intertemporal price discrimination that occurs
when price declines as time progresses and consumers anticipate this decline and react to it by delaying
their purchase (see summary and citations in Lilien et al. [23], page 187). This setting is diﬀerent from
our work since we do not focus on the price decrease alone and instead consider more general situations in
which prices may increase, decrease or neither. “Gaming” behavior by the customers (e.g., delayed purchase
or buying tickets for resale later) is an interesting aspect of the dynamic pricing problem and one that is
typically omitted from the dynamic pricing literature. Although it is beyond the scope of our work, we
acknowledge this limitation and hope that it can be addressed in future work. Levinthal and Purohit [22]
consider intertemporal pricing in the context of the durable goods problem when the product becomes ob-
solete over time due to introduction of a superior product. Eliashberg and Steinberg [10] investigate joint
pricing/inventory decisions when price can be adjusted continuously. The work of Rajan et al. [27] consid-
ering pricing of the product that is subject to value drop is particularly relevant since, similar to our model,
it analyzes the problem with the single-ordering decision at the commencement of the season and dynamic
pricing throughout the season. Additionally, the optimal timing of the length of the season is a decision
variable that is somewhat related to the optimal timing of multiple price changes in our paper. However,
the price in their paper can be adjusted continuously, which is diﬀerent from our work.
In the operations management literature price discrimination/dynamic pricing has been studied in sev-
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eral contexts using both stochastic and deterministic models of customer demand (models in market-
ing/economics are predominantly deterministic). Although the deterministic demand assumption is, ad-
mittedly, a major simplification, there are several reasons to consider deterministic models (see Bitran and
Caldentey [4] for details). First, deterministic models are easier to analyze and they often provide good
approximations for stochastic models. Hence, deterministic models can provide valuable insights, especially
on the way various parameters impact pricing policies. Second, deterministic solutions are typically optimal
asymptotically. Finally, deterministic models are widely used in practice. Among papers using deterministic
demand, Kunreuther and Schrage [19] is one of the early papers on this topic and work of Gallego [15], Gupta
et al. [17] and Smith and Achabal [29] are most closely related to ours. Gallego [15] develops a dynamic
deterministic model to analyze timing and pricing in the problem with price-dependent arrival rate, one price
change and two streams of customers: one for low-fare and one for high-fare tickets (we have a common
stream of customers). Gupta et al. [17] develop a deterministic pricing model (and also present stochastic
extension) with an arbitrary number of price changes and a specific (multiplicative) form of the arrival rate
function. Among other results, they show that if price sensitivity of customers is monotonically increasing,
it is optimal to decrease price throughout the season. Our analysis generalizes this result by characterizing
situations in which price decrease/increase is optimal for a more general form of the arrival rate function.
Smith and Achabal [29] assume that the demand depends on both price and current inventory and, similar
to our work, show that the optimal inventory/capacity selection is independent of the price trajectory. In
their setting it may be optimal to have a non-zero ending inventory.
Research on dynamic pricing in stochastic settings is surveyed by Elmaghraby and Kesinocak [11], Chan et
al. [8], Bitran and Caldentey [4] and McGill and van Ryzin [24]. Papers in this stream model customer ar-
rivals as a Poisson process, allowing an unlimited number of price changes. The closest papers in this stream
also consider situations in which there is a pre-determined set of allowable prices (so that only the timing
of price changes is a decision) or, alternatively, in which the timing of price changes is pre-determined but
prices are set optimally. Most papers in this stream assume that the customer arrival rate is time-invariant
while we do not impose such a restriction. Gallego and van Ryzin [16] show that charging a single deter-
ministic price is asymptotically optimal in this setting, a result that we confirm and generalize. Bitran and
Mondschein [5] analyze both continuous pricing and a policy with a limited, pre-determined number of price
changes. However, the timing of these price changes is not a decision variable in their model. They find that
the expected revenue varies significantly in the number of price changes. Feng and Gallego [13] consider a
situation in which only one price change is allowed (while we allow multiple changes). As in our paper, the
timing of the price change is a decision variable but prices are pre-specified. To derive regularity condition,
they utilize a notion of complementarity. Zhao and Zheng [34] were, perhaps, the first to relax the time-
invariance of the arrivals assumption. They allow for continuous price changes and derive a condition that is
suﬃcient for monotonicity of prices. We show that this condition is also suﬃcient when the number of price
changes is limited, and we link this condition to notions of complementarity. In a similar setting, Feng and
Gallego [14] consider the problem of switching among multiple pre-determined prices (in our problem prices
can be decision variables). They cite diﬃculties in deriving conditions suﬃcient for monotonicity of prices.
We find such conditions in a setting with deterministic arrival rate. Aviv and Pazgal [1] numerically analyze
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the impact of the number of price changes on the dynamic pricing policy and find that the optimal profit
is concave increasing in the number of allowed price changes and moreover, the benefits from having more
price changes are decreasing with the increase in product inventory. Other papers in this stream analyze
the problem of pricing dynamically multiple products. A diﬀerent stream of research analyzes simultaneous
pricing/inventory control problem in which there are multiple price changes but the timing of these changes
is not a decision variable (see Federgruen and Heching [12]).
To summarize, this paper makes three primary contributions. Our first contribution is in analyzing the
dynamic pricing problem with a limited number of price changes and providing insights into pricing and
timing decisions. Most of the related papers either allow for continuous price changes or assume that the
firm operates in a multiple-period environment with time-invariant demand characteristics in each period.
The former assumption diﬀers from our work since we assume that the number of times price can be changed
is limited, which is important when there are costs associated with each change. The latter assumption also
diﬀers from our work since we model demand during the period as a more general time-dependent continuous
process. Our second contribution is that instead of focusing on a specific price trajectory, we employ a
more general model with a minimal number of assumptions that can incorporate both price increases and
decreases and establish when one or the other situation arises, thus making the results applicable to a variety
of industries. In some instances these assumptions are shown to be necessary and suﬃcient and thus cannot
be further relaxed. Finally, we contribute to the methodology by demonstrating the connection between
various notions of complementarity and structural properties of the solution to the dynamic pricing problem.
While previous papers have identified some similar structural results, none, to our knowledge, connects them
to the notions of complementarity between price and time components of the arrival rate function. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. We first outline our model, assumptions and limitations in Section 3.
In Section 4 we conduct in-depth analysis of the problem with a limited number of price changes. To gain
additional insights, in Section 5 we introduce simplifying assumptions that make the model more transparent
and derive additional results. The paper ends with a discussion of the results in Section 6. Throughout the
presentation, several simple illustrative examples are given to enhance the reader’s intuition.
3 Model setup
Consider a monopolistic company that commits to selling products (or tickets) during the time period
t = [0, 1] where t = 1 is the event symbolizing the end of sale (airplane departure, start of the movie, end
of the selling season). Equivalently, we can assume that there are multiple identical time periods with the
same demand characteristics during each period due to, e.g., seasonality. During the selling period customers
willing to purchase the product at price p arrive dynamically at a rate λ(t, p), that is, demand is a continuous
function of price and time, while the decision to purchase or not purchase the product is based solely on the
current price. This model can incorporate, for example, uncertainty in customer reservation prices. Specif-
ically, suppose there is a known distribution of customer reservation prices v, F (t, p) = Pr(v < p|t), and
customers arrive at a price-invariant rate λ(t) so that, from the company’s point of view, customers who make
the purchase arrive at a rate λ(t, p) = λ(t) (1− F (t, p)). Note that we preclude the arbitrage opportunity:
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there is no way for customers to buy products for resale later and customers are also not allowed to “wait”
for a lower price (even though this may be the case in practice). In this sense, the decision to buy or not
buy is instantaneous (or myopic), i.e., like most papers addressing the issue of intertemporal price discrimi-
nation we abstract away from considering customer “gaming” behavior that is beyond the scope of the paper.
We use subscripts to denote partial derivatives and underscore to denote vectors. For simplicity, we abuse
mathematical notation somewhat, e.g., by writing λp(t, p∗), which means that the first derivative w.r.t.
price is evaluated at p∗. We assume that λ(t, p) ≥ 0 is a diﬀerentiable function that is non-increasing in p,
λp(t, p) ≤ 0. Further, we require that the revenue rate function defined as pλ(t, p) be concave in p for any
t, i.e., 2λp(t, p) + pλpp(t, p) < 0. For example, any λ(t, p) concave in p satisfies this requirement, but some
non-concave demand functions also satisfy it. To ensure feasibility, we assume that there exists a finite p∞
such that λ (t, p∞) = 0. The company establishes price pi, i = 0, ..., N on time interval [Ti, Ti+1], T0 = 0 and
TN+1 = 1 (see Figure 1).
 
T0=0 T1 T2 TN-1 TN TN+1=1 
p0 
p1 
p2
pN-1 
pN
Figure 1. Illustration of the pricing policy.
Denote the total quantity sold at price pi by Qi, the total inventory/capacity by C and the profit function by
π. Optimal decision variables and profits are denoted by superscript “∗”. There is an explicit administrative
cost associated with price changes, K1(N), which is a non-decreasing function of N , the number of price
adjustments. Further, the capacity can be purchased at an increasing (weakly) convex cost K2(C) one time
only. The sequence of events is as follows: the company (1) purchases the capacity, (2) makes the decision
regarding the number of price adjustments, (3) sets the timing of these adjustments and (4) sets prices.
Ultimately, we would like to gain insights into the following quite general problem:
maxπ = max
C
"
max
N
"
max
T0≤T1≤...≤TN+1
"
maxp
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
piλ(t, pi)dt
s.t.
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, pi)dt ≤ C
#
−K1(N)
#
−K2(C)
#
. (1)
In the formulation (1) we set the timing of price changes before optimizing over prices and the capacity
constraint is imposed at the last (pricing) stage. This order of events has been selected for practical consid-
erations: firms often set timing (e.g., Thanksgiving sale, 21-day advance purchase, Fall and Spring catalogs)
and then decide on prices given the amount of product available for sale. We have verified that interchanging
timing and pricing decisions has no eﬀect on the solution if the capacity constraint is ignored. If, however,
the capacity constraint is present, it appears that interchanging pricing and timing decisions does aﬀect our
results. It is quite possible that some practical situations require an alternative order of decisions. Without
loss of generality we assume that the variable cost of using capacity is zero. If necessary, variable cost v can
be subtracted from price so that the revenue rate would be (p− v)λ(t, p). Moreover, we assume that there
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is no salvage value of inventory/capacity. This assumption is, again, without loss of generality because in
a deterministic model like ours capacity would always be set so that it is exhausted. If, however, capacity
is not a decision variable but is instead specified exogenously then the salvage value s can still be added as
long as p ≥ s so that it is always more profitable to sell than to salvage, a plausible assumption.
In (1) we have a rather complex non-linear mixed-integer programming problem that consists of four sequen-
tial optimizations. Understandably, the greatest complexity lies in establishing the structural properties of
the optimization problem with respect to N since it involves solving an integer program given that cost
function K1(N) can take almost any form. For example, an information system is often needed to eﬀectively
support price changes (e.g., reservation systems in the case of airlines, digital price labels in retail). Hence,
K1(N) has a large fixed and a small incremental component, meaning that once the decision has been made
to purchase the information system, price changes become close to costless (except for the implicit costs
due to possible conflicts with customers). One can see then that there could be two local maxima: do
not purchase the system and establish a single price (N = 0) or purchase the system and adjust the price
continuously (N = ∞). Bitran and Caldentey [4] summarize solutions for the above model when N = 0
and N = ∞. These solutions provide, correspondingly, a lower and an upper bound for the optimal profit.
Bitran and Caldentey [4] show that there is a unique optimal solution to the pricing problem, that the
optimal price is non-increasing in the capacity constraint and that there is a unique solution to the capacity
problem. As we discussed earlier, the solution with N = 0 may not be economical and the solution with
N = ∞ is sometimes undesirable in practice. This motivates our next eﬀort, which is to consider a finite
number of price changes, an approach that provides a trade-oﬀ between the desire to price discriminate and
the complexity involved in administering continuous pricing.
4 Partial price discrimination (0 < N <∞)
Increasing the number of price changes allows a company to increase profit from its lower bound (the no
price discrimination case) towards its higher bound (the perfect price discrimination case). If price changes
are costly, the firm faces a trade—oﬀ. In many practical situations the resulting number of price changes
will be rather small so that the optimal N can be found through complete enumeration. Examples include
catalog companies (with two to four catalogs per year), retail companies (with a few major sales events
tied to holidays, e.g., Thanksgiving, Christmas) and airline companies (with 21-, 14- and 7-day advanced
purchases). Hence, to simplify the problem and achieve some transparency in the analysis, we eliminate
the integer programming part of the problem by assuming for most of the paper that the number of price
changes N is known. The issue of selecting the number of price changes optimally is addressed in the last
section.
4.1 Exogenous set of prices
We first consider a situation in which prices are not decision variables but rather a set of allowable prices is
exogenously given, possibly due to some strategic considerations. Such a problem has received considerable
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attention in the literature since firms sometimes restrict prices to a limited discrete set (see Gallego and van
Ryzin [16], Feng and Gallego [13], Feng and Gallego [14]). Suppose that the set of admissible prices P is
given exogenously (but the order of prices is not prescribed) and the total number of prices in P is N + 1,
i.e., the cardinality of P is N + 1. We assume that each price in P can be used only once but if the same
price has to be used more than once then it should be included in the set several times. This assumption is
needed to avoid the complication arising if the number of prices does not match the number of price changes
so that some prices or price changes have to be eliminated. To simplify the problem further, assume for
the time being that there is no capacity constraint (for example, the product can be produced to order as
customers arrive and there is ample production capacity) so that the objective function is
maxπ = max
T0≤T1≤...≤TN+1
NX
i=0
Z Ti+1
Ti
piλ(t, pi)dt,
s.t. p ∈ P.
Notice that the order of prices is still a decision variable. In order to determine the optimal order of prices
in general (i.e., without further assumptions about the arrival rate function), it is necessary to enumerate
all (N+1)! possible permutations of prices. However, to gain further intuition, assume for the time being
that we know the order of prices. To characterize the optimal T = (T1, ..., TN ) , we obtain the first-order
necessary optimality conditions:
∂π
∂Ti
= pi−1λ(Ti, pi−1)− piλ(Ti, pi) = 0, i = 1, ...,N. (2)
A casual analysis of the expression (2) suggests that even in this greatly simplified problem many reasonable
functional forms of λ(t, p) will result in multiple stationary points. To give just one example, suppose that
λ(t, p) = a(t)− p so that (2) is equivalent to
a(Ti) = pi−1 + pi, i = 1, ...,N.
If we now take any a(t) that crosses the line pi−1 + pi several times on [0, 1] , we obtain multiple stationary
points that can be local minima and maxima.
Stationarity conditions (2) have an intuitive interpretation. At the time Ti instantaneous revenue rates at
prices pi−1 and pi are equal, which explains the presence of multiple stationary points: every time revenue
rate functions pi−1λ(t, pi−1) and piλ(t, pi) cross, there is a stationary point (see Figures 2 and 3). If we
were allowed to switch between prices pi−1 and pi any number of times, the solution would be very simple:
we would always switch to the revenue rate curve that is higher by changing the prices at each of the four
stationary points so that the optimal pricing scheme would be pi−1 − pi − pi−1 − pi − pi−1 and the solution
would be unique. Moreover, if we added revenue rate curves for all remaining prices to the picture, it would
always be optimal to switch to the highest revenue rate at the intersection of any two curves so that a unique
solution could be trivially found by inspection. However, since we are limited to a single price change from
price pi−1 to price pi, the solution for Ti is less obvious. First, we need only consider stationary points T 1i
and T 3i , since at these points the revenue rate function pi−1λ(t, pi−1) crosses piλ(t, pi) from above, resulting
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in the local maxima. The next step after identifying local maxima T 1i and T
3
i would be computing and
comparing profits at these stationary points; we might actually need to compute profits at all the stationary
points or use the second-order conditions to find local maxima.
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Figure 3. Illustration of multiple stationary points.
It turns out that when a set of prices is exogenously given it is possible to ensure that there is both a unique
optimal order of prices and a unique timing solution by satisfying some rather mild technical requirements
that do not rely on any assumptions about the first or second derivatives of λ(t, p) (and hence do not require
monotonicity or concavity) so that they can be applied to a variety of problems. To do so it is desirable to
be able to recognize situations in which there is only a single stationary point that is also the maximum.
Clearly, from looking at Figure 2, we need a condition guaranteeing that revenue rate functions cross only
once. We now introduce the adequate machinery.
Definition 1 (Milgrom and Shannon [25]). Function f(x, y) satisfies the single-crossing property (SCP) in
(x, y) if for x0 ≥ x and y0 ≥ y, f(x0, y) ≥ f(x, y) implies that f(x0, y0) ≥ f(x, y0).
The SCP essentially means weak complementarity between x and y: the higher value of x paired with the
higher value of y dominates the lower value of x. The SCP is used in economics primarily to show para-
metric monotonicity results (as we will explain shortly) but in our particular problem the SCP also helps
ensure uniqueness of the solution. A convenient feature of the SCP is that it is preserved under increasing
transformation. For example, if we know that g(·) is an increasing function and f(x, y) satisfies the SCP,
then g(f(x, y)) satisfies it as well. The power of the SCP is that it is the weakest condition that guarantees
uniqueness of the solution as well as monotonic order of prices. In other words, it is impossible to further
relax this condition in Proposition 1 below without additional assumptions.
Proposition 1. Suppose the revenue rate function pλ(t, p) satisfies the SCP in (p, t) (correspondingly in
(−p, t)). Then the objective function is strictly quasiconcave in each Ti and the solution to the problem with
the fixed price set P is unique and found as follows:
1. Prices are arranged in the monotonically increasing (correspondingly, decreasing) order p0 ≤ p1 ≤ ... ≤
pN .
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2. For each price pair (pi−1, pi), a unique optimal T ∗i is found from (2).
3. Any price pi such that T
∗
i ≥ T ∗i+1 is eliminated from the set P, remaining prices are re-numbered and
T ∗ is re-calculated. Likewise, if Ti ≤ 0 then price pi−1 is not used and if Ti ≥ 1 then price pi is not
used.
Proof: We only prove the case with monotonically increasing prices. Consider any two prices pi−1 and pi.
A definition of the SCP implies that if x0 ≥ x, then f(x0, y)−f(x, y) crosses zero only once and only from be-
low. Applying this definition to the revenue rate function yields that, for pi > pi−1, piλ(t, pi)−pi−1λ(t, pi−1)
crosses zero once from below or equivalently pi−1λ(t, pi−1)−piλ(t, pi), for all i, crosses zero once from above
which is identical to having a unique solution to (2) and ensuring that the solution is a maximum since
evidently the objective function is strictly quasiconcave in each Ti. From the definition of the SCP it is clear
that prices are increasing. ¥
The SCP will also work if we do not impose the assumption that pλ(t, p) is a concave function of p and
moreover, λ(t, p) does not even need to be diﬀerentiable and decreasing in p. Note that if revenue rate
functions cross twice there is still a unique maximum since the second crossing would be a local minimum
but we would have to use second-order conditions to distinguish the minimum from the maximum. To
illustrate a situation in Proposition 1 in which one of the prices is not used, consider Figures 4 and 5.
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Figure 4. The SCP is satisfied and all prices are used.
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Figure 5. The SCP is satisfied but not all prices are used.
The SCP is satisfied and hence there are unique solutions to (2). In Figure 4, T1 < T2 so that all prices are
used. However, in Figure 5, T1 > T2 so that it is optimal to switch from the price p0 to the price p2 at time bT .
The next issue is how to identify revenue rate functions pλ(t, p) that satisfy the SCP since verifying it using
the definition may be cumbersome and there are essentially no other useful ways. There are some stronger
conditions that imply the SCP and we describe two of the most useful ones. The first one is supermodularity.
Definition 2 (Topkis [30]). Function f(x, y) is called supermodular in (x, y) if f(x, y) + f(x0, y0) ≤
f(min(x, x0),min(y, y0)) + f(max(x, x0),max(y, y0)).
Lemma 1 (Topkis [30]). Any function f(x, y) that is supermodular in (x, y) (alternatively, in (−x, y)) sat-
isfies the SCP in (x, y) (correspondingly, in (−x, y)).
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Supermodularity is a stronger condition than the SCP since it essentially requires that an increase in one
variable increases the incremental return to the increase of the other variable, which is a stronger no-
tion of complementarity than the SCP. Indeed, we can re-state Definition 2 as follows: for pi > pi−1,
piλ(pi, t)−pi−1λ(pi−1, t) is monotonically increasing in t for all t, i.e., under the supermodularity assumption
not only do revenue rate curves cross once but also the absolute distance between them first monotonically
decreases and then monotonically increases. Hence, supermodularity of the revenue rate function implies
concavity of the objective function. As we will see shortly, there are straightforward methods to characterize
supermodular functions, making them more convenient to work with than SCP functions. For example,
verifying that ∂2f(x, y)/∂x∂y ≥ 0 is suﬃcient to show supermodularity. In addition, supermodularity is
preserved under convex increasing transformations and it is also preserved under addition, which allows easy
construction and recognition of supermodular functions. A second suﬃcient condition for the SCP is Total
Positivity.
Definition 3 (Karlin [18]). Function f(x, y) is called totally positive of order 2 (TP2) if f(x, y) ≥ 0 and¯¯¯¯
¯ f(x, y) f(x, y0)f(x0, y) f(x0, y0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≥ 0
for all x < x0, y < y0.
Lemma 2 (Topkis [30]). Any function f(x, y) that is TP2 in (x, y) (alternatively, (−x, y)) satisfies the SCP
in (x, y) (correspondingly, in (−x, y)).
Like supermodularity, TP2 is stronger than the SCP. To see this, re-state Definition 3 as follows: for
pi > pi−1, piλ(pi, t)/pi−1λ(pi−1, t) is monotonically increasing in t for all t. This statement directly implies
that piλ(pi, t)/pi−1λ(pi−1, t) crosses 1 only once, which ensures that the SCP holds. Unlike supermodularity
and similar to the SCP, TP2 does not require monotonicity of the absolute distance between the two revenue
rates. Hence, generally speaking TP2 is neither implied by nor does it necessarily imply supermodularity.
Note that, similar to the SCP property, TP2 ensures strict quasi-concavity of the objective function. TP2 is
preserved under multiplication which, again, allows the construction of TP2 functions with ease. It is now
desirable to obtain conditions for the demand function λ(t, p) that guarantee the SCP for the revenue rate
function pλ(t, p). We will state several related results.
Proposition 2. If any of the following is true about λ(t, p) (or λ(t,−p)):
1. λt(t, p) + pλtp(t, p) ≥ 0, ∀t, p;
2. λ(t, p)λtp(t, p)− λt(t, p)λp(t, p) ≥ 0, ∀t, p;
3. λt(t,p)λ(t,p) is non-decreasing in p, ∀t;
4.
λp(t,p)
λ(t,p) is non-decreasing in t, ∀p;
5. λ(t,p
0)
λ(t,p) is non-decreasing in t for p
0 ≥ p;
6. λ(t
0,p)
λ(t,p) is non-decreasing in p for t
0 ≥ t;
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then the revenue rate function pλ(t, p) satisfies the SCP in (p, t) (correspondingly, in (−p, t)).
Proof: See Appendix.
This set of conditions can be readily applied to any functional form of λ(t, p) and some of these conditions
have intuitive interpretations that enhance managerial intuition. For example, consider Condition 3. Define
the time-elasticity of demand at time t when price is p as follows:
²t(t, p) =
∂λ(t, p)/ ∂t
λ(t, p)/ t
,
which gives the relative rate of change (or the speed of change) in the demand with time. This way con-
dition 3 has an intuitive interpretation. For example, to ensure that pi−1 < pi (the airline case), we would
require that at any point the time-elasticity of the demand is increasing in price and in case pi−1 > pi
(retailing), we would want the time-elasticity to decrease in price. It also helps to focus on a very specific
case: for instance, ²t(t, pi) < 0 (demand is decreasing with time at price pi). Then the proposition says
that, for pi−1 < pi to be optimal, it is suﬃcient for the demand to be decreasing at price pi−1 as well and
moreover, at price pi−1 the demand should decline more quickly (i.e., the absolute speed of change is higher).
In economics, demand elasticity typically refers to price-elasticity of demand, i.e., change in demand relative
to change in price. Condition 4 is convenient in that it can be interpreted in terms of the price-elasticity of
demand. Indeed, define the price-elasticity of demand at time t and price p as follows:
²p(t, p) =
∂λ(t, p)/ ∂p
λ(t, p)/ p
.
Then Condition 4 requires that the price-elasticity of demand be non-decreasing over time. The time-
elasticity defined above is quite diﬀerent from price-elasticity: the former can be positive as well as negative
and the latter is typically negative. In most cases, price-elasticity is defined in terms of absolute value so that
higher price-elasticity is associated with lower optimal price and vice versa. The following three examples
demonstrate applications of other conditions of Proposition 2.
Example 1: λ(t, p) = a− tp satisfies Condition 1 in (−p, t) because
λt(t, p) + pλtp(t, p) = −2p ≤ 0.
Example 2: λ(t, p) = a(t)− p2 satisfies Condition 2 in (p, t) for increasing a(t) because
λ(t, p)λtp(t, p)− λt(t, p)λp(t, p) = 2pa0(t) ≥ 0.
Example 3: λ(t, p) = a(t)e−p/b(t) satisfies Condition 5 if b(t) is increasing in t because
λ(t, p0)
λ(t, p)
= e(p−p
0)/b(t),
is non-decreasing in t. Note also that the application of Conditions 1 and 2 in this case is not prudent since
taking derivatives is quite cumbersome. It is worth pointing out here that Feng and Gallego [13] use TP2
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property to demonstrate monotonicity results in a setting with pre-determined prices and time-invariant
Poisson arrivals. However, since TP2 naturally holds for the Poisson arrival process, they do not generalize
this result to other arrival processes. Later, Feng and Gallego [14] state that it is diﬃcult to derive similar
conditions if the time-invariance assumption is relaxed. In this sense, our monotonicity results are more
general and one can hope that they also hold in a more realistic stochastic setting.
Since prices are given exogenously, it is important to understand the impact that an increase or decrease
in price (possibly due to a change in the competitive market situation) has on the optimal timing of price
changes. For this purpose the SCP provides the necessary and suﬃcient condition for monotone comparative
statics since it ensures complementarity between p and t, meaning that any increase/decrease in price will
increase/decrease the optimal time to change prices.
Lemma 3 (Milgrom and Shannon [25]). Let X be a lattice, S ⊂ X, Y a partially ordered set, and
f(x, y) : X × Y → R. Then argmaxx∈S f(x, y) is monotone non-decreasing in (y, S) if and only if f(x, y)
is quasisupermodular in x and satisfies the SCP in (x, y).
Unfortunately, the fact that the revenue rate function satisfies the SCP does not necessarily imply that the
objective function satisfies it as well. Moreover, the suﬃcient condition for the objective function to satisfy
the SCP appears cumbersome. Instead, we use a stronger notion of supermodularity to obtain the desired
result.
Proposition 3. Define bp(t) = argmaxp pλ(t, p) and suppose that the revenue rate function satisfies the SCP
in (p, t). Then the optimal solution T ∗i is increasing in pi if pi > bp(T ∗i ) and is decreasing in pi if pi < bp(T ∗i ).
Correspondingly, T ∗i is decreasing in pi−1 if pi−1 > bp(T ∗i ) and is increasing in pi−1 if pi−1 < bp(T ∗i ).
Proof: We prove the statement for pi only. Notice that, once Proposition 1 is applied, the problem is
separable in all T ∗i . Supermodularity of the objective function in (Ti, pi) implies the SCP in (Ti, pi) and
hence is suﬃcient for T ∗i to be monotone increasing in pi (see Lemma 3). To verify supermodularity, it is
suﬃcient to ensure that the second-order cross-partial derivative is non-negative:
∂2π
∂Ti∂pi
= − ∂
∂pi
(piλ(Ti, pi)) .
Notice that the expression in brackets is the revenue rate function, which is assumed to be concave. From
the definition of bp(t) it follows that the revenue rate function is decreasing at any pi > bp(T ∗i ), i.e.,
∂2π
∂Ti∂pi
= − ∂
∂pi
(piλ(Ti, pi)) > 0, ∀pi > bp(Ti)
so that the objective function is supermodular and T ∗i is increasing in pi (see Lemma 3). Otherwise,
∂2π
∂Ti∂pi
= − ∂
∂pi
(piλ(Ti, pi)) < 0, ∀pi < bp(Ti)
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and the objective function is submodular so that T ∗i is decreasing in pi.¥
The last result is important in understanding the implications that competitive and other forces aﬀecting
prices might have on the timing of price changes and shows that such eﬀect is non-trivial since increase in
price can lead to either increase or decrease in the timing of price change. To develop the intuition, lets
focus on monotonicity of T ∗i w.r.t. pi. To see why T
∗
i is decreasing in pi on pi ∈ [0, bp(T ∗i )) and is increasing
on pi ∈ (bp(T ∗i ),∞), observe that on the former interval
∂2π
∂Ti∂pi
= −λ(Ti, pi)− piλp(Ti, pi) < 0,
or equivalently |²p(t, p)| < 1, while on the latter interval |²p(t, p)| > 1. It is conventional to say in the former
case that demand is inelastic (since a unit-increase in price decreases the demand by less than a unit) and in
the latter case that demand is elastic. Hence, if at some price demand is inelastic, an increase in pi naturally
makes it more profitable to charge pi on a longer time interval because the price increase outweighs the
demand decrease and leads to an increase in the revenue rate. Since revenue rate is concave in p, revenues
are decreasing (demand is elastic) for any p > bp and revenues are increasing (demand is inelastic) for any
p < bp.
The analysis of the optimal timing decision so far has been done without the capacity constraint. We shall
now turn to the problem in which, in addition to timing, the capacity may be set optimally
maxπ = max
C



 maxT0≤T1≤...≤TN+1
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
piλ(t, pi)dt
s.t. p ∈ P,
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, pi)dt ≤ C

−K2(C)

 .
It turns out that the complementarity between p and t in the form of TP2 condition imposed on the revenue
rate function is suﬃcient to guarantee uniqueness of the solution. Moreover, optimal timing of price changes
is monotone in the capacity constraint.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the revenue rate function pλ(p, t) is TP2 in (p, t) (alternatively, in (−p, t)).
Then:
1. Prices are non-decreasing (non-increasing), p0 ≤ p1 ≤ ... ≤ pN .
2. There is a unique T ∗ characterized by the following optimality conditions
(pi−1 − µ)λ(Ti, pi−1)− (pi − µ)λ(Ti, pi) = 0, i = 1, ...,N,
where Lagrange multiplier µ = 0 if capacity is not a constraint and µ is found from the capacity
constraint otherwise.
3. All T ∗i s are non-decreasing (non-increasing) in C.
4. The objective function π(C) is concave in C and hence there is a unique solution to the capacity
problem.
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Proof: See Appendix.
Results 1, 2 and 4 are direct extensions of Proposition 1 to the capacitated problem while result 3 is new.
The intuition behind monotonicity of all T ∗i s in capacity is as follows: lower capacity should lead to higher
average price. However, since prices are exogenously given, higher average price can only be achieved through
charging higher prices on longer time intervals. Hence, for example, we increase the average price by short-
ening time interval [T0, T1] where the lowest price p0 is charged and widening time interval [TN , TN+1] where
the highest price pN is charged. It is, however, not immediately clear if any other time interval extends or
shortens although all intervals do shift to the left. Result 4 is rather standard and appeared (under diﬀerent
assumptions) in Gallego and van Ryzin [16], and in Zhao and Zheng [33].
Note that, although uniqueness and the structure of the solution are preserved under the capacity constraint,
monotonicity of timing w.r.t. price (Proposition 3) appears diﬃcult to prove. The reason is that the
application of monotonicity properties like the SCP, supermodularity and TP2 requires that the decision
space be a lattice (see Lemma 3), but with the capacity constraint it is no longer obvious that the decision
space is a lattice and the analysis breaks down. To summarize, we have seen that, when prices are exogenously
given, finding the optimal timing of a limited number of price changes is significantly harder than when
the number of such changes is not limited. Nevertheless, we were able to find conditions that guarantee
uniqueness of the solution (otherwise the problem is not well-behaved in the sense that multiple local minima
and maxima are possible) and characterize situations in which prices are monotone throughout the sales
period. For a non-capacitated problem we also describe the eﬀects of exogenous price changes on the timing
of these changes. We now turn to the problem with endogenized pricing decision.
4.2 Endogenous prices
Just as we did previously, we consider the simplified problem with pre-determined timing of price changes
first. One example of the situation in which timing is pre-determined is retail sales events tied to major
holidays or the weather. This setting has received some attention in the literature (see Bitran and Mondschein
[5]). Further, for the time being ignore the capacity constraint. The optimization is
maxπ = max
p
"
NX
i=0
Z Ti+1
Ti
piλ(t, pi)dt
#
. (3)
This problem is separable in decision variables so one has to solve N + 1 pricing problems with a single
price each (i.e., the non-discriminating case) and the solution is trivially unique due to the concavity as-
sumption about the revenue rate function. An interesting question in this setting is the characterization of
the impact that the timing has on prices; i.e., if for some reason there is a need to adjust timing, what is
the corresponding change in prices? Such a situation may occur if, for example, the company would like to
test the sensitivity of prices to external factors (e.g., weather) that may force changes in the timing of price
changes and hence changes in pricing. To answer this question we employ methodology similar to that in
Proposition 3, only this time T is a parameter and p is a decision variable.
16
Proposition 5. Define bp(t) = argmaxp pλ(t, p). Then the optimal solution p∗i−1 (Ti−1, Ti) is increasing in
Ti if p
∗
i−1 (Ti−1, Ti) < bp (Ti) and is decreasing in Ti if p∗i−1 (Ti−1, Ti) > bp (Ti) . Correspondingly, the optimal
solution p∗i (Ti, Ti+1) is decreasing in Ti if p
∗
i (Ti, Ti+1) < bp (Ti) and is increasing in p∗i if p∗i (Ti, Ti+1) > bp (Ti) .
Proof: Follows along the lines of the Proof of Proposition 3. ¥
Proposition 5 shows that complementarity between p and t helps characterize situations in which prices are
monotone in timing, thus complementing Proposition 3. The similarity between the results of Propositions 3
and 5 is due to the symmetry of the supermodularity property: i.e., a function f(x, y) that is supermodular
in (x, y) is also supermodular in (y, x) (this is not necessarily the case for the SCP). As in Proposition 3,
the intuition behind the result can be gained by considering demand elasticity. We now turn to the more
general problem with the capacity constraint but still keep timing exogenous:
maxπ = max
C
"
maxp
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
piλ(t, pi)dt
s.t.
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, pi)dt ≤ C
−K2(C)
#
. (4)
Pricing problems on each time interval are no longer separable; all prices are linked through the capacity
constraint. We saw that, when there is only one price, a tighter capacity constraint increases the price. The
natural question is: does this result hold when there are several prices charged throughout the selling period
or will some prices rise while others fall? The next proposition assures that all prices are decreasing in the
capacity constraint and moreover, there is a unique optimal capacity.
Proposition 6.
1. The objective function (4) is jointly concave in p and unique optimal prices are characterized by the
following optimality conditions
p∗i (Ti, Ti+1) = −
R Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, p∗i )dtR Ti+1
Ti
λp(t, p∗i )dt
+ µ, i = 0, ..., N, (5)
where Lagrange multiplier µ = 0 if capacity is not a constraint and µ is found from the capacity
constraint otherwise.
2. All p∗i s are non-increasing in C.
3. The objective function (4) is concave in C so that there is a unique solution C∗ to the capacity problem.
Proof: See Appendix.
The second result of Proposition 6 can be paralleled with the result in Federgruen and Heching [12] and other
papers so that, in a simultaneous pricing/inventory replenishment problem, the optimal price is decreasing in
the amount of initial inventory. However, because multiple prices are involved in our problem, the technique
for showing this result is diﬀerent: as was mentioned earlier, the supermodularity argument cannot be applied
here the same way as in Federgruen and Heching [12] because the decision space is not a lattice. Results 2
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and 3 also appeared (under diﬀerent assumptions) in Gallego and van Ryzin [16], and in Zhao and Zheng [33].
The solution to the problem with exogenous prices is useful by itself but it also helps us characterize a
solution to the more general problem of jointly finding optimal pricing, timing, and capacity:
maxπ = max
C
"
max
T0≤T1≤...≤TN+1
"
maxp
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
piλ(t, pi)dt
s.t.
PN
i=0
R Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, pi)dt ≤ C
#
−K2(C)
#
.
Optimal pricing solution p∗(T ) can be borrowed from Proposition 6, so we proceed with obtaining optimal
timing when prices are chosen optimally. The first derivatives are found as follows:
∂π
∂Ti
=
∂p∗i−1
∂Ti
ÃZ Ti
Ti−1
λ(t, p∗i−1)dt+ p
∗
i−1
Z Ti
Ti−1
λp(t, p∗i−1)dt
!
+ p∗i−1λ(Ti, p
∗
i−1)
+
∂p∗i
∂Ti
µZ Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, p∗i )dt+ p
∗
i
Z Ti+1
Ti
λp(t, p∗i )dt
¶
− p∗iλ(Ti, p∗i ), i = 1, ...,N.
When the capacity constraint is binding, there is no easy way to simplify (6), so the optimality condition
remains quite intractable. However, if capacity is specified exogenously and the constraint is not binding (or
if capacity is ample), then µ = 0 and we can make use of the fact that prices are chosen optimally according
to (5): the expressions in brackets vanish and the first-order necessary conditions for optimal timing are
characterized by
p∗i−1(T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i )λ(T
∗
i , p
∗
i−1(T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i )) = p
∗
i (T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1)λ(T
∗
i , p
∗
i (T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1)), i = 1, ..., N. (6)
We see that the optimality conditions are essentially the same as when prices are exogenously given and
hence the interpretation is similar: whenever instantaneous revenue rates from two prices are equal, there is
a stationary point. The diﬀerence is, of course, that this time prices are functions of T . As will be demon-
strated later, without restrictions on λ(t, p) the objective function can easily be multimodal in T with many
local maxima and minima. However, this complication does not preclude us from establishing a suﬃcient
condition for price monotonicity throughout the sales period, which is important for developing simple pric-
ing rules in practice.
Proposition 7. Suppose the revenue rate function is TP2 in (t, p) (correspondingly, in (−t, p)). Then the
optimal pricing policy is monotonically increasing (correspondingly, decreasing) throughout the sales period
for any T , C, and N .
Proof: See Appendix.
The last result provides a rather simple tool for identifying situations in which prices are monotone through-
out the selling period. We see once again that complementarity (in the form of TP2) between price and time
can be instrumental in characterizing the optimal pricing policy. The important take away from the last
proposition can be verbalized through price elasticity of demand: using characterization 4 in Propositions
2 we can say that increasing (decreasing) price elasticity implies increasing (decreasing) prices. Recall that
higher price elasticity is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a higher optimal price in a static monopoly
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pricing model and furthermore, it is possible to verify that the condition of Proposition 7 is necessary and
suﬃcient for continuous dynamic price p∗(t) to be monotone (Zhao and Zheng [34] demonstrate a related
result in a stochastic setting). We have shown that the same condition is suﬃcient (but clearly not necessary)
for the pricing policy with a limited number of price adjustments to be monotone.
We close this section with the analysis of a specific form of the demand function. Suppose that the demand
function is multiplicatively separable in t and p, i.e., λ(t, p) = α(t)β(p). This form of the demand function
has been popular in the literature due to its analytical convenience (see Gallego and van Ryzin [16], Feng
and Gallego [13], and Gallego [15]). Using (5), we can find optimal prices as follows:
p∗i = −
β(p∗i )
R Ti+1
Ti
α(t)dt
βp(p∗i )
R Ti+1
Ti
α(t)dt
+ µ = − β(p
∗
i )
βp(p∗i )
+ µ, i = 0, ..., N.
Clearly, all prices are equal, which is the equivalent of not price discriminating. Hence, in the absence
of demand uncertainty there is no benefit in charging multiple prices when such functional form is used.
This result extends the finding of Gallego and van Ryzin [16] that charging a single price is optimal in the
continuous version of the problem. Intuitively, this result is a consequence of the fact that ²p = const for
this form of demand function.
5 Linear pricing model
To gain further insights into the problem, for the remainder of the paper we introduce simplifying assumptions
regarding the demand function λ(p, t). Specifically, we use the following model of customer behavior. Suppose
that at any point of time t customers considering the purchase arrive at a rate a(t) and find out that the
current price is p. At this point b(t)p customers decide that the price is too high, leave and never return.
The remaining a(t) − b(t)p customers decide to make a purchase. Hence, from the company’s point of
view, purchasing customers arrive continuously at a rate λ(p, t) = a(t)− b(t)p. An equivalent interpretation
is: a(t) is the customer arrival rate and the purchase is made with probability 1 − b(t)p/ a(t). This form
of the demand function is used frequently in the marketing literature (see an extensive discussion of this
assumption and additional references in Eliashberg and Steinberg [10]; our demand model is slightly more
general since we allow that not only a(t) but also b(t) is a function of time). Functions a(t) and b(t) can
be interpreted as demand intensity and price sensitivity, correspondingly. We assume that both a(t) and
b(t) are positive diﬀerentiable functions. Essentially, we assume that customer demand is linear in price but
non-linear in time, and the eﬀects of time-varying market size and price-sensitivity are separated, making the
model intuitively appealing (as noted by Eliashberg and Steinberg [10]). We also assume that the problem
parameters are such that it is never optimal to charge a price higher than a(t)/b(t) (i.e., at any point of
time there is a non-zero demand). Assumptions similar to this one are standard in the marketing literature
that uses the same demand function (for example, it is conventional to assume that p(t) ≤ a(t)/b(t) as in
Eliashberg and Steinberg [10] and citations therein). We will proceed by solving the problem backwards and
analyzing pricing, timing, and capacity choices separately.
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5.1 Price optimization
Suppose for now that C and T are exogenously given and focus on pricing. Using the result of Proposition
6, for a given arbitrary C and T optimal prices can be found in a closed form as follows:
p∗i (Ti, Ti+1, C) =
Z Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dt
Áµ
2
Z Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
¶
+∆, ∀i, (7)
where ∆ = max
³
0,
R 1
0 a(t)dt− 2C
´.³
2
R 1
0 b(t)dt
´
. Observe at this point that the impact of the increase
in the capacity constraint is quite intuitive: if T is fixed, prices will decrease, and moreover, an increase in
capacity results in the increase of all prices by the same amount so that the price diﬀerential between any
two prices remains constant. Further, the condition of Proposition 7 (price monotonicity) can be simply
re-stated as follows: if a(t)/b(t) is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in t, then prices are monotonically
increasing (decreasing) throughout the sales period. To gain some intuition, it helps to think about ratio
a(t)/ b(t) as “customer density” per unit of demand sensitivity. If customer density is increasing with time,
price is rising and vice versa.
5.2 Optimization of timing
We now turn to optimization over T . First, we use optimal prices to re-write the objective function as
follows:
π =
NX
i=0
ÃµZ Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dt
¶2,µ
4
Z Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
¶!
−∆2
Z 1
0
b(t)dt−K2(C). (8)
The first term represents optimal revenue in the absence of the capacity constraint (it only depends on the
timing and the number of price changes). The last two terms represent capacity cost that does not depend
on optimal timing. What is important is that we can separate timing decision and optimal capacity choice,
meaning that the capacity choice decision does not aﬀect the timing of price changes, and vice versa. This
unexpected result greatly simplifies further derivations and it also has important implications for compa-
nies operating in the environments that can be characterized by the model discussed in this section (i.e.,
the model with linear pricing). For example, if companies with diﬀerent capacities (product inventories)
face the same market conditions (i.e., the same demand function) then they will establish the same timing
of price changes (even though prices will be diﬀerent). Since timing and capacity decisions are separable,
the marketing function of setting the timing of price changes (e.g., promotions) can be separated from the
operational function of making capacity decisions as long as prices are coordinated with operations. This is
an important implication since capacity decisions often have to be made far in advance but it is possible to
postpone pricing and timing decisions. Moreover, the form of price discrimination (i.e., the number of price
changes) does not need to be decided at the time of capacity choice since it aﬀects revenues but not costs.
Finally, we can conclude that an increase in capacity will lead to a decrease in all prices by the same amount
without the stipulation that T should be kept constant (as was observed in the previous subsection). The
timing problem can now be reduced from profit maximization to revenue maximization (the first term in 8).
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The expression for the total revenue (8) is deceptively simple. Unfortunately, the most trivial instances of
the problem are not well behaved. For example, even with a(t) = const it is easy to come up with examples
of b(t) that result in a bimodal objective function. Moreover, even if b(t) is monotone, global concavity
cannot be guaranteed (one simple example is a = const, b(t) = 2 − t4). We now proceed with characteriz-
ing the optimal timing of price changes. Recall that the optimality condition for timing (6) was obtained
without accounting for the capacity constraint. One thing we know now is that the optimality condition for
timing in the current model will not depend on the capacity constraint since capacity and timing problems
are independent. The next proposition characterizes the global maximum.
Proposition 8. In the optimization problem (8) there are two types of stationary points.
1. Type one: stationary points T ∗i : p
∗
i−1 = p
∗
i , if they exist, are points of local minima. Hence, the global
maximum is a stationary point of the second type.
2. Type two: stationary points T ∗i are characterized by
a (T ∗i )
b(T ∗i )
=
¡
p∗i−1 −∆
¢
+ (p∗i −∆) =
1
2
ÃZ T ∗i
T∗i−1
a(t)dt
,Z T∗i
T ∗i−1
b(t)dt+
Z T∗i+1
T ∗i
a(t)dt
,Z T ∗i+1
T ∗i
b(t)dt
!
.
(9)
Proof: See Appendix.
The last proposition has several important implications. First, it shows a somewhat intuitive result that
setting T ∗ such that a single price is charged (which is equivalent to p∗i−1 = p
∗
i ) on some time interval where
it is possible to price-discriminate is not only sub-optimal, but also is about the worst thing the company
can do. Indeed, intuition suggests that an opportunity to change a price should be valuable (as long as
prices are chosen optimally) since it provides an additional degree of freedom in optimization. We also see
that the optimal timing is characterized by the optimality condition (9), which uses prices that are optimal
without the capacity constraint. This is a convenient property that is a direct result of the separability of
time setting and capacity setting functions.
Since stationary points with p∗i−1 = p
∗
i either do not exist (for example, a strict TP2 assumption would
ensure that p∗i−1 < p
∗
i ) or represent local minima, we are assured that the global maximum is the second
stationary point characterized by (9). If there is only a single solution to this optimality condition then it
is a global maximum. If, however, there are multiple solutions, one would have to evaluate the objective
function at each of them and compare since, as the example demonstrates, multi-modal objective functions
can arise. We now develop an intuition behind the optimality condition (9) by re-writing the optimality
condition as follows:
a (T ∗i )− b(T ∗i )
¡
p∗i−1 −∆
¢
= b(T ∗i ) (p
∗
i −∆) .
On the left we have the demand from customers deciding to buy products at price p∗i−1. Then on the right
we have the departure rate of customers deciding that price p∗i is too high. Hence, optimal T
∗
i is a point in
time when the demand at price p∗i−1 is equal to the departure rate at price p
∗
i .
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5.3 Setting capacity optimally
It turns out that the optimal capacity decision problem is exactly the same no matter what number of
price adjustments is used, as can be seen by considering (8). Indeed, as we have said previously, timing
and capacity decisions are separable and hence the problem of finding optimal capacity becomes that of
minimizing capacity cost (the last two terms of (8)). The optimal capacity is
C∗ =
1
2
Z 1
0
a(t)dt− 1
2
K 02 (C
∗)
Z 1
0
b(t)dt,
so that if capacity is costless then K2(C) = 0 and it is optimal to purchase
R 1
0 a(t)dt
.
2 units and sell
everything. The result that optimal capacity is independent of the type of price discrimination (for the
linear demand function) is important for companies that have to invest into the capacity far in advance,
before the pricing strategy (including type of price discrimination, number of price changes and specific
prices) is established. As we have demonstrated, such investment decisions do not have to take into account
the pricing strategy. Additionally, the administrative cost of price changes may be uncertain so that the
company may have to invest into the capacity without knowing how many price changes will be used.
5.4 Setting the number of price changes optimally
Maximization problem (8) for the optimal timing of price changes is rather involved even for the simple
forms of the arrival function. However, for illustrative purposes, we will demonstrate the optimal timing
of price changes for a couple of simple examples. Let πi denote the optimal revenue (since costs are the
same we can safely ignore them) with i price changes. Then the relative revenue loss can be calculated
as δi = 100% × (π∞ − πi) /π∞, which gives us the percentage loss due to the insuﬃcient number of price
changes relative to the maximum achievable revenue. Consider the following two arrival rate functions:
Case 1. a(t) = 1 + t, b(t) = 1. In this case, the price sensitivity of customers is time-invariant while the
market size is a linear increasing function of time. If price sensitivity is time-invariant, price changes are
simply spread uniformly over the time period Ti = (i − 1)/N, i = 2, ..., N (this result can be shown much
more generally).
Case 2. a(t) = 1, b(t) = 1 + t. In this case price sensitivity is not time-invariant and it can be shown
that optimal price changes are made at Ti = −1 + 2
i−1
N , i = 2, ..., N. For example, one price change would
happen at T1 = 0.414214, two price changes would happen at T1 = 0.259921 and T2 = 0.587401, etc. That
is, there is a tendency to make price changes earlier rather than later since price sensitivity is very low at
the beginning and more profit can be extracted early in the season by administering frequent price changes.
It seems plausible that such a result should hold more generally.
Table 1 below presents % revenue losses for these two cases as well as for four additional forms of the arrival
rate function that cannot be solved analytically. Observe that the benefits of one extra price change are
convex decreasing (this is consistent with Aviv and Pazgal [1]) with the first price change, making an impact
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that is 2-4 times higher than the second price change. It appears that the arrival functions that are concave
in time result in the highest revenue losses if the number of price changes is limited.
(1 + t)− p 1− (1 + t) p
¡
1 + t2
¢
− p 1− (1 + t2)p
√
t− p 1− p
√
t
δ0 3.57 3.82 4.76 4.50 11.11 25.00
δ1 0.89 0.98 1.07 0.96 3.09 13.39
δ2 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.40 1.34 8.48
δ3 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.84 6.39
δ4 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.61 4.98
Table 1. Revenue losses and the number of price changes.
6 Conclusion
We have used a simple yet quite general model to analyze intertemporal price discrimination. Both customer
segmentation on the basis of time of purchase and administrative costs of price changes are endogenized.
Demand is characterized by a general time- and price-dependent function. The relative simplicity of the
model allows us to incorporate pricing and timing decisions for a problem with multiple price changes and
capacity constraint that can also be a decision variable.
We have used this model to analyze inventory/capacity pricing decisions for a product sold during a short
season. Since there are no up-front restrictions on the way the demand evolves with time, we consider
simultaneously situations in which price increase or decrease may be optimal. For the problem in which a
set of prices is given exogenously but the timing of the price changes is a decision variable, we demonstrate
that the problem may exhibit multiple local minima and maxima. However, rather mild regularity condi-
tions (single-crossing property, total positivity, supermodularity) related to complementarity between price
and time both ensure that there is a unique timing decision and help characterize situations in which price
increase/decrease is optimal. These conditions also ensure that there is a clear relationship between prices
and timing decisions, i.e., higher/lower prices lead to the price change later/earlier in the season. We provide
a number of ways to recognize situations in which the desired regularity conditions hold and we also explore
the intuition behind some of these conditions. Moreover, we show that the optimal timing of price changes
is monotone in the capacity/inventory and we prove uniqueness of the solution to the capacity choice problem.
When prices are endogenized but timing is exogenous, we find optimal prices and characterize the depen-
dence of pricing decisions on the timing of price changes and capacity constraint. When pricing, timing and
capacity decisions are made jointly, we show that the TP2 condition ensures monotonicity of prices through-
out the sales period. To gain further insights, we simplify the problem by introducing a linear pricing model
that is amenable to closed-form solutions. For this model, we find analytical solutions and show that, no
matter what price discrimination scheme is used, the objective function is separable into two parts: revenue
and capacity cost. Hence, marketing decisions (number of price changes and timing of price changes) and
the operational decision (capacity choice) are separable as well, i.e., at the time of the capacity decision the
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firm does not need to commit to a certain price discrimination scheme. Finally, we utilize simple examples
to illustrate the optimal timing of price changes and the impact of an additional price change.
Overall, we were able to link some notions of complementarity (single-crossing property, total positivity
and supermodularity) to monotonicity of solutions to the dynamic pricing problem and some monotone
comparative statics. While various notions of complementarity are known to lead to similar results in eco-
nomics, applications of complementarity to dynamic pricing are rare. We make precise this connection
and demonstrate methodology that might be used to derive analogous results for other problems (includ-
ing stochastic dynamic pricing). Finally, several interesting research topics can be motivated by our work.
First, an important issue that has received little attention in the literature is price discrimination under com-
petition (see Netessine and Shumsky [26] for non-price competition in revenue management): firms often
operate in an environment in which pricing decisions cannot be made in isolation from market reaction to
these decisions and hence monopoly assumption may not be satisfactory in some settings. Another issue is
incorporating consumer behavior such as gaming and diversion from one price to the other as in Gallego [15].
Our paper relies on several assumptions that limit the applicability of the results. First and foremost, we
ignore stochasticity on customer arrivals and fully focus on dynamic pricing in response to changes to shifts in
customer reservation prices. This simplification allows us to obtain cleaner technical conditions and insights.
Introducing stochasticity would require diﬀerent solution techniques, see Aviv and Pazgal [1] and Xu and
Hopp [32]. One can hope that some of our results could be extendable to the stochastic demand setting;
more work is needed in this direction. The second major assumption is the absence of gaming behavior
on the consumer side. Rational consumers expect price changes and may delay/speed up their purchasing
decisions. To the best of our knowledge, Aviv and Pazgal [2] is the only dynamic pricing paper incorporating
such consumer behavior in a model with stochastic demand. This direction of research should prove fruitful
in the future.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: From Topkis [30], supermodularity for diﬀerentiable functions is equivalent to
the positivity of the second-order cross-partial derivative, i.e.,
∂2 [pλ(t, p)]
∂t∂p
= λt(t, p) + pλtp(t, p) ≥ 0,
and Condition 1 is verified. For Condition 2, note that TP2 property is equivalent to log-supermodularity
(see Karlin [18]), i.e.,
∂2 log [pλ(t, p)]
∂t∂p
=
λ(t, p)λtp(t, p)− λt(t, p)λp(t, p)
λ2(t, p)
≥ 0,
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and the result follows. To see Conditions 3 and 4, note that the definition of TP2 functions can be restated
as follows after dividing by y0 − y and taking a limit y0 → y:¯¯¯¯
¯ f(x, y)
∂f(x,y)
∂y
f(x0, y) ∂f(x
0,y)
∂y
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≥ 0, for all x < x0.
If we now replace y with t and x with p, it becomes apparent that condition 3 is equivalent to the TP2
property. Reversing the variables yields Condition 4. Conditions 5 and 6 (also called the monotone likelihood
ratio property) are obtained by taking the derivative w.r.t. t
∂
∂t
λ(t, p0)
λ(t, p)
=
λt(t, p0)λ(t, p)− λ(t, p0)λt(t, p)
λ2(t, p)
≥ 0,
which is an equivalent of Condition 3. Condition 6 is obtained similarly. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: We can ignore K2(C) since it does not aﬀect any results. We first demonstrate
that the objective function is concave at any stationary point, which means that there is only one such point
that is also a global maximum. Along the way it will be clear that the prices are monotonically increasing.
Form a Lagrangian (see Bertsekas [3]) as follows:
L(T , µ) =
NX
i=0
Z Ti+1
Ti
piλ(t, pi)dt− µ
Ã
NX
i=0
Z Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, pi)dt− C
!
, (10)
find first derivatives :
∂L
∂Ti
= (pi−1 − µ)λ(Ti, pi−1)− (pi − µ)λ(Ti, pi), i = 1, ..., N,
∂L
∂µ
= −
NX
i=0
Z Ti+1
Ti
λ(t, pi)dt+ C,
and second derivatives:
∂2L
∂T 2i
= (pi−1 − µ)λt(Ti, pi−1)− (pi − µ)λt(Ti, pi), i = 1, ..., N, (11)
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ
= −λ(Ti, pi−1) + λ(Ti, pi), i = 1, ..., N. (12)
We can form the bordered Hessian as follows:
H =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
0 ∂
2L
∂T1∂µ
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
... ∂
2L
∂TN∂µ
∂2L
∂T1∂µ
∂2L
∂T 21
0 ... 0
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
0 ∂
2L
∂T 22
... 0
... ... ... ... ...
∂2L
∂TN∂µ
0 0 ... ∂
2L
∂T 2N
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
.
We now show that the diagonal entries of the Hessian are negative at any stationary point and moreover,
the determinant of the Hessian has sign (−1)N everywhere, which is suﬃcient for concavity of the objective
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function at any stationary point, implying that there is only one stationary point that is a global maximum.
To see this, equate the first derivative to zero, solve for (pi−1 − µ) and substitute the result into (11):
∂2L
∂T 2i
=
(pi − µ)λ(Ti, pi)
λ(Ti, pi−1)
λt(Ti, pi−1)− (pi − µ)λt(Ti, pi)
= (pi − µ)λ(Ti, pi)
µ
λt(Ti, pi−1)
λ(Ti, pi−1)
− λt(Ti, pi)
λ(Ti, pi)
¶
, i = 1, ..., N.
Clearly, showing that the expression in brackets is negative is suﬃcient for verifying that the diagonal
elements are negative. By Proposition 2, Property 3, the TP2 assumption is suﬃcient for the expression in
brackets to be negative as long as pi−1 < pi for all i. It immediately follows that it is optimal to have prices
monotonically increasing. It only remains to verify that the determinant of the Hessian has a sign (−1)N .
We do so by converting the Hessian into an equivalent lower-triangular matrix whose determinant can be
computed analytically. Re-write the Hessian as follows:
NY
i=1

−
∂2L
∂T 2i
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ


¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
0 ∂
2L
∂T1∂µ
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
... ∂
2L
∂TN∂µ
−
³
∂2L
∂T1∂µ
´2Á
∂2L
∂T 21
− ∂2L∂T1∂µ 0 ... 0
−
³
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
´2Á
∂2L
∂T 22
0 − ∂2L∂T2∂µ ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
−
³
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
´2Á
∂2L
∂T 22
0 0 ... − ∂2L∂TN∂µ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
,
and add lines 2 through N + 1 to the first line:
NY
i=1

−
∂2L
∂T 2i
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ


¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
−
PN
i=1
³
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ
´2Á
∂2L
∂T 2i
0 0 ... 0
−
³
∂2L
∂T1∂µ
´2Á
∂2L
∂T 21
− ∂2L∂T1∂µ 0 ... 0
−
³
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
´2Á
∂2L
∂T 22
0 − ∂2L∂T2∂µ ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
−
³
∂2L
∂TN∂µ
´2Á
∂2L
∂T2N
0 0 ... − ∂2L∂TN∂µ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
.
The resulting matrix has the same determinant as the original Hessian. Moreover, this matrix is lower-
triangular and hence its determinant can be computed by multiplying diagonal elements:
|H| = (−1)N
NY
i=1


∂2L
∂T2i
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ

× (−1)N
NY
i=1
·
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ
¸
× (−1)
NX
i=1
"µ
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ
¶2, ∂2L
∂T 2i
#
= (−1)
NY
i=1
·
∂2L
∂T 2i
¸
×
NX
i=1
"µ
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ
¶2, ∂2L
∂T 2i
#
,
and the sign of the determinant is
sign |H| = (−1)× (−1)N × (−1) = (−1)N .
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Hence there is only one stationary point that is the global maximum. To show monotonicity of T ∗ w.r.t.
the capacity constraint, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT). Denote by ∇CJ the gradient-vector
of derivatives of decision variables T and µ w.r.t. C, and by ∇2CL the gradient-vector of second-order
derivatives of the Lagrangian w.r.t. C. Then the IFT can be stated as follows: for a fixed C and optimally
chosen T ,
∇CJ = −H−1 ×∇2CL.
Since the Hessian is non-singular, we can multiply both sides by H and write explicitly:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
0 ∂
2L
∂T1∂µ
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
... ∂
2L
∂TN∂µ
∂2L
∂T1∂µ
∂2L
∂T 21
0 ... 0
∂2L
∂T2∂µ
0 ∂
2L
∂T22
... 0
... ... ... ... ...
∂2L
∂TN∂µ
0 0 ... ∂
2L
∂T 2N
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
×
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
∂µ
∂C
∂T1
∂C
∂T2
∂C
...
∂TN
∂C
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ = −
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
∂2L
∂µ∂C
∂2L
∂T1∂C
∂2L
∂T2∂C
...
∂2L
∂TN∂C
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ .
The right-hand side has a very simple structure:
∂2L
∂µ∂C
= 1,
∂2L
∂Ti∂C
= 0, all i,
so that the IFT yields the following system of equations:
NX
i=1
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ
∂Ti
∂C
= −1,
∂2L
∂Ti∂µ
∂µ
∂C
+
∂2L
∂T 2i
∂Ti
∂C
= 0, all i.
From the second equation we see that ∂µ/ ∂C and ∂Ti/ ∂C must have opposite signs and moreover, ∂Ti/ ∂C
has the same sign for all i. From the first equation it is clear that ∂Ti/ ∂C > 0, all i, so that ∂µ/ ∂C < 0,
which proves Statement 3. To prove Statement 4 we can use the fact that ∂µ/ ∂C < 0 to show that the
objective function is concave in C when the timing is set optimally. Recall that the Lagrange multiplier µ
is equal to the marginal value of the capacity constraint C, i.e.,
dπ(p∗(C), µ∗(C))
dC
= µ(C),
(see, e.g., Bertsekas [3] for details). Taking the second derivative yields
d2π(p∗(C), µ∗(C))
dC2
=
∂µ(C)
∂C
,
which we have shown to be negative. It follows that the objective function is concave in C and hence there
is a unique solution to the capacity problem. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6: Once again, ignore K2(C) for simplicity. To prove concavity, re-write the inner
optimization problem in (5) similar to Proposition 1:
maxπ = max
Q
" PN
i=0 pi(Qi)×Qi,
s.t.
PN
i=0Qi ≤ C.
#
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What we have is a concave optimization problem subject to a linear constraint that is known to be concave.
The Lagrangian in this case is identical to (10) obtained earlier. The first derivatives are
∂L
∂pi
=
Z Ti+1
Ti
(λ(t, pi) + (pi − µ)λp(t, pi)) dt, i = 0, ...,N,
from which the unique optimal prices are found and the proof of Statement 1 is complete. To show mono-
tonicity of prices w.r.t. the capacity constraint, we apply once again the IFT:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
0 ∂
2L
∂p0∂µ
∂2L
∂p1∂µ
... 0
∂2L
∂p0∂µ
∂2L
∂p20
0 ... 0
∂2L
∂p1∂µ
0 ∂
2L
∂p22
... 0
... ... ... ... ...
∂2L
∂pN∂µ
0 0 ... ∂
2L
∂p2N
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
×
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
∂µ
∂C
∂p0
∂C
∂p1
∂C
...
∂pN
∂C
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ = −
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
∂2L
∂µ∂C
∂2L
∂p0∂C
∂2L
∂p1∂C
...
∂2L
∂pN∂C
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ .
We can find analytically all the entries of ∇2L as follows:
∂2L
∂p2i
=
Z Ti+1
Ti
(2λp(t, pi) + (pi − µ)λpp(t, pi)) dt ≤ 0, i = 0, ...,N,
∂2L
∂µ2
= 0,
∂2L
∂pi∂µ
= −
Z Ti+1
Ti
λp(t, pi)dt ≥ 0, i = 0, ..., N.
Elements of ∇CL are the same as in Proposition 4. Using these results, we obtain from the IFT the following
system of simultaneous equations that is very similar to the one obtained in Proposition 6:
NX
i=0
∂2L
∂pi∂µ
∂pi
∂C
= −1, (13)
∂2L
∂p2i
∂pi
∂C
+
∂2L
∂pi∂µ
∂µ
∂C
= 0, i = 0, ..., N. (14)
From (14) we see that either ∂µ/∂C ≥ 0 and ∂pi/∂C ≥ 0 all i, or ∂µ/∂C ≤ 0 and ∂pi/∂C ≤ 0 all i due
to signs of the second derivatives. However, only ∂pi/∂C ≤ 0 all i can satisfy (13) so that ∂µ/∂C ≤ 0
and ∂pi/∂C ≤ 0 all i is the only possible solution which completes proof of Statement 2. Statement 3
immediately follows similar to Proposition 4. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider two neighboring prices, p∗i−1 and p
∗
i . It is suﬃcient to show that p
∗
i−1 ≤
p∗i for any i. First, consider the pricing optimality condition (5) that we re-write as follows: p−µ = ψ (p) . Let
p∗ be the (unique) solution to this problem. p∗ can be found graphically as an intersection of two functions
of p: the left-hand side, which is increasing linearly in p at a rate equal to 1, and the right-hand side, which
can either be decreasing in p or increasing but at a rate less than 1. Clearly, there is a unique intersection
corresponding to the solution p∗. Imagine now that function ψ (p) is replaced by a function bψ (p) such thatbψ (p) ≥ ψ (p) , all p (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Illustration of price monotonicity.
It is understandable that if bp∗ is the solution to p − µ = bψ (p) , then p∗ < bp∗.We now demonstrate that
functions
ψ (p) = −
R Ti
Ti−1
λ(t, p)dtR Ti
Ti−1
λp(t, p)dt
, bψ (p) = − R Ti+1Ti λ(t, p)dtR Ti+1
Ti
λp(t, p)dt
, (15)
satisfy the condition bψ (p) ≥ ψ (p) , all p if the revenue rate function is TP2. Indeed, using characterization
4 from Proposition 2 we can state the TP2 property as follows: λ(s, p)λp(t, p) ≤ λp(s, p)λ(t, p), t ≤ s. Now
integrate both sides over t ∈ [Ti−1, Ti] , then over s ∈ [Ti, Ti+1] and re-arrange to obtain:
−
R Ti+1
Ti
λ(s, p)dsR Ti+1
Ti
λp(s, p)ds
≥ −
R Ti
Ti−1
λ(t, p)dtR Ti
Ti−1
λp(t, p)dt
.
Clearly, TP2 implies that bψ (p) ≥ ψ (p) where bψ (p) ,ψ (p) are defined in (15), which in turn implies that
p∗i−1 ≤ p∗i and hence prices are monotonically increasing no matter what T , C, and N are. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8: The first derivatives of (8) can be found as follows:
∂π
∂Ti
=
2a(Ti)
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dt
R Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt− b(Ti)
³R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dt
´2
³R Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt
´2
+
−2a(Ti)
R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dt
R Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt+ b(Ti)
³R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dt
´2
³R Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
´2
=


R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt
−
R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dtR Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt



2a(Ti)− b(Ti)


R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dtR Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
+
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt



 .
If we equate this expression to zero, there are two potential stationary points: one with p∗i−1 = p
∗
i (first
bracket) and another with p∗i−1 6= p∗i (second bracket). We verify that the first stationary point is a local
minimum by evaluating the second derivative at the point whereR Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt
=
R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dtR Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
.
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The second derivative is:
∂2
∂T 2i
NX
i=0


³R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dt
´2
R Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt


=

2a(Ti)− b(Ti)


R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dtR Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
+
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt



 ∂
∂Ti


R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt
−
R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dtR Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt


=

2a(Ti)− 2b(Ti)
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt


×

 1R Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt

a(Ti)− b(Ti)
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt

+ 1R Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
Ã
a(Ti)− b(Ti)
R Ti+1
Ti
a(t)dtR Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt
!

= 2

a(Ti)− b(Ti)
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt


×

 1R Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt

a(Ti)− b(Ti)
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt

+ 1R Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt

a(Ti)− b(Ti)
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt




= 2

a(Ti)− b(Ti)
R Ti
Ti−1
a(t)dtR Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt


2
 1R Ti
Ti−1
b(t)dt
+
1R Ti+1
Ti
b(t)dt

 > 0,
showing that at p∗i−1 = p
∗
i the objective function is locally convex. This completes the proof. ¥
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